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An Unhurried View of Copyright. By Benjamin Kaplan.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. Pp. 142. $5.
That nothing exists without a name is a notion attributed by an-
thropologists to "primitive" society. It has a good, picturesque ring to
it until something points up how the same notion bedevils us all.
Copyright is one of those humbling reminders that even lawyers can
be lulled by names. Recorded intellectual productions are "copy-
rights," or so we say, and if not that, they must be nothing at all. The
name is everything. Then we look again, and see cobwebs.
At a time when the science if not the art of communication grows
more sophisticated yearly, it may be fitting to reconsider the rules that
govern transactions relating to the creative process. Not all of these
rules are in copyright laws and not all are even acknowledged to be
law; some of them bear inconvenient names and others have no names
at all. Nevertheless they exist. They ought to be brought out of limbo,
defined, and set down, and not merely to insure against criticism by
future anthropologists. Works of art are too important for protection
by Swiss pikes. Something more up-to-date is required, something
imaginative in the image of the protggd.
Law and the creative process meet always in uneasy confrontation.
They are like the British and the Americans, sufficiently alike to share
common bonds, and still curiously dissimilar. They have this in com-
mon, that they both take themselves very seriously, but their self-
esteem leads them off on divergent directions. Dickens, who came close
to making the Law a protagonist in many of his novels, draws this
memorable portrait in Pickwick XXIV when a beadle at Ipswich en-
ters the room.
"My name's Tupman," said that gentleman.
"My name's Law," said Mr. Grummer.
"What?" said Mr. Tupman.
"Law," replied Mr. Grummer, "law, civil power, and execative;
them's my titles; here's my authority. Blank Tupman, blank Pickvick
-against the peace of our sufferin Lord the King-stattit in that case
made and purwided-and all regular. I apprehend you Pickvickl Tup-
man-the aforesaid."
So much for the Law, but what of the creative process? Chekhov
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describes that in The Black Monk. In this tale Kovrin, a writer, is
inspired by visions of a black monk who whispers to him that he is a
genius. Kovrin is persuaded to be cured of his hallucination, and dies.
The story suggests a view of the creative process as another order of
reality trespassing on this one, bursting over the boundary line into
our own. In all fairness to the law, it must be said that Dickens and
Chekhov were writers, not lawyers, but their visions have meaning.
Law and the creative process are in a way opposites.
Dilemmas of this kind are reflected in books about copyright law.
The distinguished scholars who write them may not be consciously
aware of dealing with irreconcilables but they come down, sooner or
later, more on one side than on the other. The essential sympathy
shows through.
In An Unhurried View of Copyright, Professor Benjamin Kaplan
makes his position clear. He is one of the law men, not one of the
gypsies. This is where he stands:
I conclude with the observation that when copyright has gone
wrong in recent times, it has been by taking itself too seriously,
by foolish assumptions about the amount of originality open to
man as an artificer, by sanctimonious pretensions about the in.
equities of imitation. I confess myself to be more worried about
excessive than insufficient protection, and follow Voltaire in
thinking that plagiarism, even at its worst, "est assurement de tous
les larcins le moins dangereux pour la socidtd."
In order to read this passage in its proper frame, the reader must
be aware of two subliminal factors. One is that Professor Kaplan makes
it the conclusion of his chapter entitled "Plagiarism Re-examined."
The other is that he equates protection with copyright, at least by in-
ference. Briefly then, he is thinking in terms of potential litigation
founded on historic copyright law. Too much of a good thing, says
Professor Kaplan. Many will agree.
An Unhurried View of Copyright is the most engaging, reasonable,
informative "anti-protectionist" tract available. The style is elegantly
donnish, quite worthy of the" subject. The arguments are always tem-
perate and mercifully lacking in the shrill imprecations against authors'
rights as wicked monopolies that disfigure so many other writings on
this subject. Indeed the style reminds one of that early classic, Birrell's
Seven Lectures On The Law And History of Copyright In Books
(1899).
Substance is something else again. This critic disagrees with Pro-
fessor Kaplan's mistrust of copyright. So does most of the copyright
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community, authors and their customers alike. Kaplanization means
too much empathy with the legal process, too little with the creative.
In a preface to the book Dean Warren of the Columbia Law School
writes:
Professor Kaplan's emphasis on the desirability of greater free-
dom of dissemination of ideas is especially significant because it is
at odds with a strong contemporary trend toward more restrictive
and longer protection of the exclusive rights of wrriters and com-
posers. In addressing himself to the challenging issues involved
in the protection of literary property, with clarity, erudition and
wit, he renders a special service by questioning some of the time-
worn assumptions in the copyright field.
Fair enough, except for Dean Warren's assumption that more copy-
right impedes the free flow of ideas. Trends do require reexamination,
and in this little book, it is well done. Nevertheless one can hope that
history will deem it the brilliant summation of a bad case.
An Unhurried View of Copyright includes solid chapters about copy-
right history and proposals and prospects for legislative reform. But
the heart of the book, especially in view of the author's predilection,
is the section containing his reflections on plagiarism. Here we find
the inevitable emphasis on Judge Learned Hand, who looms so large
in traditional copyright law, together with dry comment about "spe-
cialists"-a group apparently not among Professor Kaplan's favorite
people-who think fictional characters should be protected outside the
stories in which they appear. At pp. 74-6 the anti-protectionist view is
presented consummately:
Copyright law wants to give any necessary support and encour-
agement to the creation and dissemination of fresh signals or
messages to stir human intelligence and sensibilities: it recognizes
the importance of these excitations for the development of indi-
viduals and society. Especially is copyright directed to those kinds
of signals which are in their nature "fragile"-so easy of replica-
tion that incentive to produce would be quashed by the prospect
of rampant reproduction by freeloaders. To these signals copy-
right affords what I have called 'headstart," that is, a group of
rights amounting to a qualified monopoly running for a limited
time. The legal device has been considered not too complex for
administrative purposes and on the whole easier to handle than
alternatives such as government subventions....
The headstart conferred (which is the encouragement given, the
inducement held out) should be moderate in all its dimensions.
Magnify the headstart and you may conceivably run the risk of
attracting too much of the nation's energy into the copyright-
protected sectors of the economy. But more serious is the danger
1475
The Yale Law Journal
of hobbling unduly the reception and enjoyment of the signals
by their potential audience, or of clogging the utilization of the
signals by other authors in the creation of further or improved
signals for additional audiences. Eliciting publication is not an
end in itself. Publication without easy access to the product would
defeat the social purpose of copyright already mentioned as pri-
mary. Beyond this, various additional social needs and demands
strive to make themselves felt to modulate and qualify the head-
start as we move from one to another of the types of work covered
by copyright.
"Headstart" is the key thought in the Kaplan perspective. Qualified
headstart, socially balanced headstart, limited period of time if not
grudging and reluctant headstart-all of it sounds a little patronizing
to authors. Unfortunately for those of us who disagree, Professor Kap-
lan has a good deal of American history to support him. Surprisingly
he makes little of that argument, so let us do it ourselves, in the
interest of objectivity.
Britain's position is ambiguous, but American copyright law puts
the public ahead of the author. Readers and audiences are its principal
wards; those who create for them get thrown some good bones so they
will go on producing. An informed public must be encouraged to keep
reading just as a clean one must be encouraged to keep washing: ac-
cordingly, it is in the public interest to have new books and new de-
tergents. But the soap merchant stands somehow higher than the
author.
The early statutes were "Acts for the encouragement of Literature
and Genius." For example, New Jersey's 1783 copyright law was en-
titled "An Act for the Promotion and Encouragement of Literature."
The New Hampshire law of the same year stated its purpose in a
preamble, "to encourage the publication of Literary Productions,
honorary and beneficial to the public," while Connecticut and New
York went so far as to provide price-fixing to insure the availability of
books. Art. I, Sec. 8 of the U.S. Constitution confers power on the
Congress
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing
for limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
Of course the expressed goal is theory; the trick is balancing one
set of rights against the other in fair equation. Professor Kaplan is
most concerned with the commonweal. Now at last the pendulum is
swinging towards the rights of authors. It will not be sufficient to those
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of us who rejoice in this trend to bask in our good fortune. An Un-
hurried View of Copyright raises some fundamental questions that
require answers.
To begin with, no responsible scholar suggests that mere ideas merit
protection. There may be special circumstances involving fiduciary
relationships or implied contracts sufficient to vary this theorem, but
nobody wants to extinguish the public domain. In what follows we are
dealing with some product of imagination that transcends ideas.
What, then, should be the dimensions of copyright? Time and space
are the setting in which the drama plays itself out. How long? How far?
Where do you mark borders?
The time question is the easier. Historically, American law has
provided protection for two consecutive terms of twenty-eight years
each. Most other countries in the West permit copyright to run for
the author's life plus fifty years. Time and again we have had non-
sensical worries occasioned by this disparity in term between American
and other laws. A television program based on a British play no longer
protected in the United States but still "copyright" in Canada could
be shown in Detroit but not Windsor. Other things being equal, the
pedestrian consideration of uniformity ought to be decisive.
And other things are at least equal. Some authors write in order to
provide for their families. The members of the Berne Union, as well
as most of the "specialists," accept life plus fifty as the fair term for ac-
complishing that aim. Professor Kaplan prefers a shorter term, and
he is entitled to his opinion. But some of us would not find it shocking
to have more. Most property, after all, is owned perpetually except
insofar as it is consumed by creditors and estate taxes. Why must we
go "the people's way" only with authors?
Indeed, there is something to be said for the old English system of
University Copyright, granted to the Universities at Oxford and
Cambridge, four Scottish Universities and some colleges such as Balliol,
as a device to encourage scholarship. Under that system, protection was
perpetual, subject to certain restrictions against divestiture of control.
You can no longer obtain University Copyright for new works, but
some of the old ones are still protected-witness the report in the
Evening Standard for February 6, 1964, that Balliol had succeeded in
enjoining the unauthorized publication of two Jowett translations.
Of course, constitutional difficulties may well preclude American
experimentation with such a system, and no groundswell for amend-
ment is likely. Nevertheless the point is worth making. The notion of
a perpetual copyright to be held by America's highest institutions of
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learning is neither more outlandish nor less socially laudable than
fifty-six years, or ten years, or any other grudging term. Long live the
Master of Balliol, or his brain children.
For the rest of us, though, if you begin with the traditional American
assumption that publication starts the clock ticking, there is no such
thing as a perfect time period for copyright. The only sensible ap-
proach is to join with the rest of the civilized world and have done
with it.
Questions of space are more formidable. How far should the bounds
of protection extend? An Unhurried View of Copyright sets out many
of the standards used in measuring traditional copyrights. Professor
Kaplan relies on existing case law, which is a reasonable road for a
lawyer to travel. But it is not the way life is lived in the communica-
tions industries.
There a dynamic world is making ground rules for current con-
tracts and future laws. If the genius of the common law is its ability
to catch up with the market place, it had better look twice at the
communications field. As suggested earlier, "copyright" is the wrong
word-wrong chiefly in being incomplete-for describing the exotic
new plants that grow in this surrealist garden.
Consider the following passage, introduced less in the hope of afford-
ing readers innocent amusement than of bringing out a point:
Florienbad was burning. The world's espionage capital, on the
outskirts of Bucharest, was half destroyed. Among the ruins
strolled tall, indifferent Secret Agent Leverett Lowell (Harvard,
'42) wearing as always his Black Belt, Fifth Degree for Kiaijutsu
(Zen combat by Screaming), puffing casually on a consciousness-
expanding cigarette and followed by Alec, his lame ocelot who
had figured so gallantly in the Tower of London Demolition
Case. Lowell was flanked, as always, by two of his luscious Eura-
sian girl bodyguards.
A small man disguised as a passerby stood by a burning build-
ing, watching the flames with satisfaction. Lowell recognized him
as Q 50, a medium-ranking agent of the dreaded ACL, Arson
Consultants, Ltd. Q 50's eyes glistened as he turned from the con-
flagration and addressed Lowell.
"That's one for the insurance company, mate," observed Q 50.
"Touch," Lowell replied indifferently.
That deeply affecting passage, by this reviewer, appears in Vol. IV,
Television Quarterly, Fall, 1965. Its want of literary excellence makes
it thoroughly part of a tradition in copyright cases.
Leverett Lowell and his bizarre entourage may actually constitute
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property. Taken together, they are a sort of compound of elements that
the public values. Taken separately, each element may have value in
its own right, even in a different setting. As things actually happen,
especially in television, one of the girl bodyguards, with or without the
lame ocelot, may be extracted from a series about Leverett Lowell and
star in her own series without Lowell next season.
Television is the most voracious consumer of literary property on
a repeating basis. It serves, accordingly, as the ideal subject for the
study of new theories, new forms of legal life, new property concepts.
Snobbishness has no place in such studies. Judge Learned Hand's
concern was not confined to Twelfth Night.
In television the Leverett Lowell extract might be the subject of
protracted negotiation and sale. Probably but not inevitably the
character would in fact have been more fully developed in successive
episodes without appreciable enrichment. Be that as it may, Lowell
and his entourage might be dealt with as a commodity.
They might originate in a spy novel, or a film, or a series "presenta-
tion" designed specifically for television. Typically an independent
production company acquires an option, sometimes on the text of
Leverett Lowell stories, sometimes merely on the character himself and
his attendant props. The most elaborate negotiations accompany such
acquisitions. Does one remember to secure rights to Mr. Hudson
besides Holmes and Watson? How much does the original owner re-
ceive per new program episode if the series is one hour, how much if
the series is half-hour? To what extent does he share in proceeds from
a sound track album, or Leverett Lowell figurines, or theatrical exhi-
bition of two program segments stuck together as a feature film? Does
he share "spin-off" proceeds when one of the minor characters goes into
a different series? All of it sounds fantastic, but it happens.
The J. R. R. Tolkien mythology affords even more vivid illustra-
tion of the kinds of intangibles which may be sold in the market place
of incorporeal property these days. This author creates a fictitious
world filled with imaginary people, imaginary races, imaginary eras,
languages, curses, treasures-all of it, each element in the compound,
at least partly original and potentially valuable on its own. H. P.
Lovecraft did the same thing, and a devoted readership kept buying
his macabre fancies.
Television thrives on this sort of traffic. Honey WVest was telecast
weekly as a spin-off from Burke's Law. For each spin-off that gets on,
there are hundreds that occupy serious men and women in tortured
negotiation for months at a time, but never appear. The spin-off
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concept is crucial. It means the transplant of one or more fictitious
elements into new settings. It describes extraction in business terms,
and it comes up in nearly all contracts for the acquisition of television
rights. There is no use pretending it will all go away if we ignore it.
Professor Kaplan and others who decry excessive protection may
have a plausible rebuttal to the argument that real life has outrun
their law. They may suggest that purchasers in this field merely buy
quit-claims to avoid lawsuits. Sometimes that will be true; television
moves quickly, and there is no time for test cases. Some of the fictitious
elements that command royalties probably are nothing but ideas with
names, and belong in the public domain. Certainly a slight shift in
presentation, a change of name, a different occupation or nationality
is sufficient to avoid legal trouble in many instances of copying. Still,
there is more to it. Once in a long time we find fictitious elements such
as characters that are both original and valuable, even under a different
name, even snipped off and planted in a new garden. The point is
that conceptually protection for elements such as these is all quite
possible.
If trade custom means anything, the broadcasting industry has
created standards that the common law must consider. Industry-wide
collective bargaining agreements between management and the Writers
Guild of America contain royalty provisions for the use of characters.
Some day they may encompass additional elements, at least in general
language.
Nevertheless trade custom is not everything, and Professor Kaplan
is entitled to legal analysis in support of our new heresies.
In supplying it, one comes back to the question of names again.
Fictitious characters are not "copyrights." Neither are fictitious eras,
languages or battles. If Shakespeare were under copyright today, an-
other's piracy of Falstaff might be a crucial factor in determining copy-
right infringement of particular plays, but Sir John is no copyright.
He is something else, something without a name.
And yet not entirely without a name. The right name is "literary
service mark protected against dilution." It lacks grace, but perhaps
we shall coin something better after examining what lies behind it.
The trademark, sibling concept to the service mark, began as a
liability and became an asset. In this happy course it ran parallel to the
copyright. One originated as a device for policing measures and stan-
dards in the medieval guilds. The other began (in England, at any
rate) as a device to record heretical authors and publishers. Then the
trademark became a sales badge identifying the source of products,
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and the copyright turned into an economic res, a legal claim to rights
in a work of art.
The two doctrines have different rules. Trademark is of uncertain
duration; its geography is not fixed, and there are sometimes restric-
tions on its transfer so as to avoid deceiving the public. It depends
largely on facts postulated at a given moment. Such and such a name is
well known in Hawaii this year as a device for identifying pineapples,
but not in Bonn, where it was famous a decade ago as a name for
bicycles. Copyright is quite different. The owvner has the security of
fixed time periods, and his protection is national, often international,
in scope. Trademark is the more flexible, copyright the more certain.
The trouble with copyright is that it leaves off too soon, and fails to
protect characters and related imaginings by Lovecraft and Tolkien.
Here trademark is a useful supplement-or service mark to be more
exact about it, since the author's creations identify his services. These
services are literary, hence the term "literary service mark." Dilution
in turn is a German doctrine, adopted by several states including New
York and Massachusetts, that protects marks against "whittling away"
by use on disparate products, even where there is no likelihood of
public confusion. In this doctrine the medieval mark ripens fully into
an asset without any of the old hurdles in the way of protection. Rolls-
Royce shoes, theoretically, would be enjoined under the dilution
doctrine. With this concept we round out the translation of that awk-
ward phrase for Sir John Falstaff: "literary service mark protected
against dilution." Today that is what Falstaff would be in law.
"Author's mark" would be a happier phrase, but what about that
old legal saw "unfair competition"? That concept is not quite adequate
for the needs of the business community, which is less concerned with
prospective torts than with property and contracts. So author's marks,
in the sense of extricable component elements of literary compounds,
deserve a place in the law's lexicon.
Not all author's marks need represent fictional characters. Mad
Magazine licensed amorphous rights, something like format but not
quite, for use in a little revue that became a national success. When
the arrangements were made, the parties were not at all concerned
with conjectural lawsuits. Everyone assumed there were rights (not
only in the word "Mad") and worked on dividing percentages of gross
weekly box office receipts. A bystanding copyright lawyer could have
brushed off the contracts as mere charades, but nobody would have
listened. Readings from Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S.
225 (1964) and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S.
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234 (1964) might have cast further doubt on the proceedings. But
nobody doubted.
These are some of the reasons why copyright inadequately describes
literary property. One is less than the others; it tells only part of the
story. If nothing exists without a name, let us have "author's marks"
or something better.
So much for time and space. In dealing with time we have applauded
the life plus fifty approach and spoken with yearning of perpetual
university copyright. In dealing with space we have gone beyond the
confines of copyright and suggested recognition of author's marks as
new forms of property. Anti-protectionists will find all this uncon-
genial, but their perspective is perhaps one-sided or worse, partial to
the wrong side.
An Unhurried View of Copyright is a way of looking at things in
terms of franchises and grants from the sovereign. It has on its side
American copyright history, with its concern for the public interest in
free or cheap communications and its unconcern for authors. At least
it has American history on its side as far as it goes.
Against this Kaplanesque view is a different way of looking at things,
more as writers and publishers and producers do. A good statement of
this second view is what G. K. Chesterton wrote in Charles Dickens
(Methuen, 1906) at p. 81:
Ordinary men would understand you if you referred currently
to Sherlock Holmes. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle would no doubt be
justified in rearing his head to the stars, remembering that Sher-
lock Holmes is the only really familiar figure in modern fiction.
But let him droop that head again with a gentle sadness, remem-
bering that if Sherlock Holmes is the only familiar figure in
modern fiction, Sherlock Holmes is also the only familiar figure
in the Sherlock Holmes Tales. Not many people could say offhand
what was the name of the owner of Silver Blaze, or whether Mrs.
Watson was dark or fair. But if Dickens had written the Sherlock
Holmes stories, every character in them would have been equally
arresting and memorable. A Sherlock Holmes would have cooked
the dinner for Sherlock Holmes; a Sherlock Holmes would have
driven his cab. If Dickens brought in a man merely to carry a
letter, he had time for a touch or two, and made him a giant.
The touch that creates giants, there perhaps is the point Professor
Kaplan forgets. It appears only occasionally, and not even the most
avid protectionist wants to dignify stock characters and mere ideas
with property attributes. By all means enlarge the public domain with
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unworthy artifice, but recognize too that there are magicians among
us.
Rewarding the few magicians is unlikely to deprive the public of its
divertissement. Producers of the most successful shows pay royalties
for rights in literary material. They make a go of it, and few others
find it necessary to present only Beaumont and Fletcher and compar-
able vintage pieces which happen to be public domain.
It must finally be said out loud, that if any professional deserves
protection, the creative artist deserves it, because he is society's dlite.
And yet these things are not generally agreed. Professor Kaplan
makes the point that nowadays authors are not so often romantic
figures in a lonely garret. More and more they are becoming efficiently
organized production teams, processing informational data for collec-
tive entities. True enough, and sad in its way. But still, it is too soon
to write an epitaph for the creative process. Perhaps that process is too
mysterious to be understood at all. Some people think of it as merely
a biochemical efflux, others deal with it in religious terms. The law
deals with it too often as an aberration from good order, a minor out-
rage of sorts that has to be kept in its place.
Nobody agrees; and so it comes about that the creative process must
be described in terms of parable.
We are every man in a state of siege, by forces massed outside the
walls we put up long ago. Most of us get on very well pretending there
is nobody outside. We attend directors' meetings, and we go home
to families, and there are some who say that the siege is a fiction
invented by the authorities to keep order. We post sentries and watch-
men to keep out the invading army, even if there is no such thing.
And then there are subversives among us, who keep secretly in touch
with the invader. These are the people who undo the bolts and open
the iron gates. These are the writers, and the musicians and artists.
They hear the battering ram, and have a longing for the enemy. They
recognize him as their own imaginings.
There ends the parable; the mystery remains. Law and the creative
process never will reach complete accommodation, but armed truce
is possible. It can be arrived at, and maintained, if we worry less about
a fictitious public and more about Merlin. He has earned his wages as
nobly as the Lord Chief Justice and the shoemaker have earned theirs.
Life without law would be hazardous, life without art intolerable.
Civilized men have no reason to suffer these deprivations if only they
will come out of the fortress and inspect far-off and remote borders.
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There they may find things not listed in books. If nothing exists with-
out a name, let them invent names.
RICHARD WINCORt
Movies, Censorship and the Law. By Ira H. Carmen. Ann
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1966. Pp. 333.
$7.95.
The enterprise known as movie censorship moved Dr. Ira Carmen, a
member of the political science department at Ball State University,
to learn how it has operated in the United States during the 20th
century, and to determine if it is constitutional. He has avoided writing
about the federal statutes concerning obscenity, the movie industry's
self-regulation, or any influence private associations may exert upon
the content or style of films. Instead, he has concentrated wholly on the
functioning of state and local censoring bodies and on the constitution-
ality of censorship itself.1
The book originated as a doctoral dissertation at the University of
Michigan and reads with the charm, though not the brevity, of an
Annotation in A.L.R. About 125 pages are devoted to a case-by-case
description of what different judges of the United States Supreme
Court have said in majority, concurring and dissenting opinions be-
tween 1915 and 1965. Wisely, Dr. Carmen has not limited himself to
cases involving motion pictures but has included litigations covering
books and magazines in which the issues of censorship and free speech
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments have been raised. Follow-
ing this material, he takes about 100 pages to summarize the relatively
few state and local laws and the state court decisions in the area of film
censorship.2 Since most of the remaining pages are taken up with an
extended bibliography,3 only about 30 pages of the book constitute
t Member of the New York Bar. A.B. 1942, LL.B., 1948, Harvard University. Author of
How TO SECURE COPYRIGHT (1950) and LITERARY PROPERTY (1967).
1. I. CARMEN, MovIEs, CENSORSHIP, AND THE LAW 1, 4 (1966) [hereinafter cited as CAR.
MEN].
2. The states covered are those maintaining some kind of state-wide film censorship
system as of early 1965: Louisiana, Florida, New York, Maryland, Virginia, and Kansas,
He also discusses the state-wide film censorship system that had formerly operated in
Ohio, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. The municipal censorship systems covered are
those of Chicago, Detroit, Memphis, and Atlanta, with passing attention to Boston, Dal-
las, and a very few others. The list of states with state censorship has changed little in
40 years, M. ERNST &A W. SEAGLE, To imE PURE 28 (1928).
3. It must also be added that the six-page index is too vague in its subject-entries to
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genuine analysis. Moreover, although the book was published late in
1966, the cut-off date for the sources used was with one or two excep-
tions4 March, 1965. In short, the book is both a chore to read and one
that despite its recent appearance must be brought up to date by inde-
pendent research. But it would be captious to leave the matter at this
because--despite its real faults-it is a book that requires the most
serious consideration.
Ever since Mae Irwin took leave from a play called The Widow
Jones to record one of its scenes on fifty feet of film, the American
public has been involved with the question of what can be permitted
to movie makers. That strip of film, released in 1896, was called The
Kiss, and for years it packed penny arcades, made the nickelodeon pos-
sible, and caused "respectable" people to regard the cinematographic
performance as inherently iniquitous. Churchmen immediately split
into two groups: those who wanted to ban motion pictures absolutely
(or exclude them from the local community or from the Lord's Day,
in the manner of alcoholic beverages) and those who thought they
could be salvaged by close supervision. The former opinion-makers
proved singularly unsuccessful, as they were later to prove with talking
records, radio, and television. The day of absolute prohibition of an
entire medium was over by the time the 20th century began, though
it took several decades to prove it. From Jeremy Taylor in the early
18th century until Billy Sunday in the 1920's, there was indeed a Puri-
tan ethic powerful enough to ban theatrical performances, ballet, opera,
and pantomime over wide areas of the English-speaking world; but its
power was waning by 1900 and today no art form is prohibited for
being immoral in itself. Even on a social and ethical level, the general
opinion for the past half century has been that there must be something
done within the form itself that is evil before that particular means of
expression can be suppressed. The salvagers among the moralists have
therefore won the day.5
But they have not been, in their turn, a group of monolithic opin-
ion. Some have consistently chosen to operate outside the scope of legal
process. They have organized associations for the purpose of reviewing
be of much use; this may work against the influence which the book might exert simply
because a harried researcher will not have time to read the whole bool.
4. See CAIMEN 9, and the plea in the Preface, CAnnmx %ii, for the author's admission
of "the threat of built-in obsolescence" in such a type of study between the time research
is done and the date it can be presented to the public.
5. G. BLUESTONE, NovELs INTo Fasit 3645 (1957) describes the influence of the Legion of
Decency upon American movies. It was at one time suggested that the greater
influence of Catholic over Protestant critics was due to the fact that the former accepted
movies, if suitably censored, whereas the latter moved for their total suppression.
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and rating films as to their appropriateness from a moral viewpoint,
with the intent of helping people avoid unpleasant experiences in the
theater and protecting their children from the psychic damage of an
immoral film. Beyond this, by means of boycotts and other forms of pres-
sure, they have induced film makers, distributors, and exhibitors not
to produce or make available to the public films that the rating group
disapproves. The power of this extra-legal approach has gone far to
create the restraining climate of the possible which underlies the indus-
try's self-regulation. 6
It is the second approach taken by the moral salvagers upon which
Dr. Carmen has concentrated his attention. Not content merely to in-
fluence the industry, many of them have sought to employ the legal
system to aid them in pursuing their ends. There are several ways in
which this can be done; not all of which are, in Dr. Carmen's defini-
tion of the term, censorship. One way calls for a pre-screening of all
movies to be shown within the jurisdiction, after which the screener
may either ban outright any movie containing scenes objectionable to
the community's moral sense or require that the offending scenes be
cut if the film is to be shown. This is what Dr. Carmen calls censor-
ship, and this is what he is against. The other way is to permit objec-
tionable material to be shown and then to prosecute the persons
concerned for obscene conduct, enjoin the film, or order it screened
subsequently for deletion of prosecutable material. These latter meth-
ods are not considered censorship by Dr. Carmen; and while he con-
cedes that they are liable to abuse, he finds no reason in policy or in
the Constitution why they should not be employed to police the com-
munity's morals.7
Throughout Dr. Carmen's book runs a certain vagueness that makes
it very difficult to know precisely where he stands upon a number of
issues. Perhaps this is due to the difficulty of the subject-matter, or
perhaps it is the result of the neutrality forced upon the author of a
doctoral dissertation; but certain matters keep intruding upon the
reader as bothersome and unresolved questions in the area of movie
regulation.
6. For sophisticated restraining approaches see Problems of Communication in a
Pluralistic Society, CONFERENCE ON COMMUNICATIONS, March 20-23, 1956 (Alarquette Uni.
versity Press, 1956) especially papers by Professor Bourke and Judge Desmond, the latter
covering ground parallel to that described by Dr. Carmen as of 1955.
7. Others, of course, use the term censorship in a far broader sense, though the system
endorsed by Dr. Carmen was that used by the ancient Greeks, R. McKEON, R. MERTON &
WV. GELLHORN, THE FREmO TO READ 53-54 (1957). Still, a post-event prosecution did have
a censoring effect on Socrates.
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First of all, there is the question of what is obscene. Dr. Carmen re-
counts at great length various judicial definitions of obscenity, and he is
rather critical of local officials when they do not rigorously adhere to
the authoritative exegesis of Roth-Albert or Kingsley or some Supreme
Court Justice. Perhaps such law enforcement officers ought to be better
informed, but the Court's definitions are not happy ones for any man
with a taste for predictability. Dr. Carmen himself is at pains to point
out the inconsistencies within the various opinons of Mr. Justice Bren-
nan, and he is properly dubious about Mr. Justice Stewart's famous
dictum about hard-core pornography: "I know it when I see it." But
when it comes to telling the reader what obscenity might be, Dr. Car-
men has been as coy as anyone writing in the field. Of course, he is no
worse in this respect than the draftsmen of three international conven-
tions on the control of the traffic in pornography; but it would have
been helpful to know what aroused Dr. Carmen-unless he, like Mr.
Justice Stewart, doesn't know till he sees it.s
Secondly, Dr. Carmen seems to accept the dogma that movies are no
different from other forms of communication and should never have
been subjected to different treatment by the law. He is sharply critical
of Mr. Justice McKenna, who concluded in 1915 that movies were
unique in their effects on audiences, and he insists repeatedly that
movies should be treated just like books, periodicals, plays, and theatri-
cal performances. 9 He does not specifically extend his reasoning to
radio and television as well, but nothing he says suggests any logical
ground for excluding them. To this view, two objections could be
interposed: that restraints similar to those used on films have been
applied to other art forms, and that viewing a film really is different
from reading or from attending the legitimate theater.
Until the 16th century, boroughs licensed all theater performances
and exercised powers of restraint over them not unlike those of a
modem municipal police chief who wants to run a clean town and to
make sure no dirty movies, naughty nightclub acts, or lurid burlesque
routines get shown. It is true that these duties were placed under the
control of the Master of the Revels (and were later subsumed by his
administrative superior, the Lord Chamberlain); but initially any act
that trod the boards had to reckon with a medieval board of burgesses.
8. Compare CARMtE.N 71-74, 88, 155 (on the difficulty in defining obscenit)) with 2 H.
ELLIs, ON LIFE AND Sx ch. 4 (1920). See also Eausr & SewARtrz, CLEssIIIP 33 (1964).
9. C AamEN 14-15, grounding his opinion upon Note, 60 YAE L.J. 696, 104-03, which
in turn claimed that "[m]odern communication research has largely disproved the exis-
tence of such a distinction."
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Prior to the end of the 17th century, only books printed by the Sta-
tioners' Company could be lawfully published in England, and the
Company maintained a committee to pass upon the lewdness of books.
It was not an active committee, nor a very effective one; but it operated
in a manner not very different from some of the modern film-censor
boards. Also, beginning in the 18th century, the Society for the Sup-
pression of Vice started to oversee lending libraries and the reading of
the newly literate masses, with results not too different in effect from
those the Legion of Decency had on films after 1922.10
But apart from this ancient history, there is the not inconsiderable
majesty of Marshall McLuhan's aper§us that "the medium is the mes-
sage" and that film, radio, video tape, live television broadcasting,
audio tape, and long-playing records are not in the same category as
anything appearing in print or occurring between a performer and a
live audience. Whether movies and the like involve the viewer more
or remove him further has been a subject of dispute; but the result is
clearly not the same, at least according to Professor McLuhan. So per-
haps the judges and censors who have insisted that a film has greater
impact than a book or even a still-picture have not been such yahoos
after all. As Sergeant Robert Murphy expressed it when interviewed
by Dr. Carmen in the Chicago Police Department, "One must remem-
ber that audio-visual techniques are the most provocative means of
communication and, therefore, must be carefully watched." Presum-
ably, Marshall McLuhan would agree, though he would likely stop
with the watching.11
Another issue Dr. Carmen necessarily avoids is that raised by the
film censor of the Atlanta Library Board: ". . . movies are made only
for financial profit and not for educational or artistic reasons."12 Quite
properly, Dr. Carmen argues that this fact ought not to put them out-
side the protection of the First Amendment, since the same charge
could as well be leveled against book publishers: the profit motive is
ubiquitous in our society. Yet the fact remains, as attested to by such
blithe spirits as F. Scott Fitzgerald and Norman Mailer, that movies
are made for money and not for reasons of science or aesthetics. There-
fore, if obscenity is a bad thing and if movies are better at pandering
obscenity than any other communicative form, the crass motives of
their makers and exhibitors cannot be overlooked; and the sensibilities
10. H. STREET, FREEOM., THE INDIVIDUAL AND TIE LAW ch. 3 (1963); N. ST. JoHN.SYAS,
OBSCENITY AND THE LAW 17, 20 (1956).
11. CARPmEN 302; M. McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA ch. 1 (1964).
12. CARMEN 321 (quoting Mrs. Christine Smith Gilliam).
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of creative intellects, crushed by harsh censorship, ought not to be
attributed to the moguls of the industry or to the camera-crankers of
the "Nudies."
But, of course, is obscenity a bad thing in and of itself? Dr. Carmen
assumes that it is constitutional to ban a book, periodical, still-picture,
film, phonograph record, and so forth simply because it is obscene.
Naturally, he would apply the more recent tests of the United States
Supreme Court that it must be without redeeming social, scientific,
or aesthetic value; but he assumes that, lacking those, it is an unmiti-
gated evil. Though unhappy over the possible unconstitutionality of
pre-screenings and prohibitions growing out of them, Dr. Carmen is
not averse to vigorous prosecution for obscenity, "after-tle-event," of
anyone distributing an infected means of communication.
In this he is probably expressing a general community sentiment.
The day when state and local boards pre-screened films may be gone
forever, despite the ruling in Times Film Corp. v. Chicago in 1961.14
The New York Court of Appeals ruled in 1965 that the United States
Supreme Court had found their state film censorship system unconsti-
tutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, 15 while in 1966 Virginia
both repealed the statute establishing motion picture censorship and
applied their obscenity prosecution statute to motion pictures.21 Kan-
sas, which had refused even to answer Dr. Carmen's communications
and which had the reputation among other censors as the "toughest"
in the country, extensively amended its regulations, effective January
1, 1966, to meet many of the criticisms previously aimed at its system.'-
The trend is clearly toward subsequent prosecution rather than pre-
screening, and Dr. Carmen's book itself is an arrow in that direction.
But how much protection does this really afford?
Perhaps films can be divided into several categories: those made by
producers, large and small, for general distribution; those made for
the specialized "art house" audiences, whether such audiences are gen-
uinely interested in aesthetics or simply in titillation; those made for
scientific or educational purposes, even if they are potentially of wider
13. CAntEN 259-60.
14. 365 U.S. 43. See CAPAtF.N 100-18, in which this case is dealt with in extenso through
comparison with other decisions.
15. Trans Lux District Corp. v. Regents, 16 N.Y.2d 711, 261 N.Y.S.2d 903, 209 N.E.2d
558 (1965). This case was decided after Dr. Carmen's book had gone to press and his
reference to it is necessarily brief. CAnstax 123n.
16. VIRGmA AcTs, 1966, ch. 86 repealed §§ 2-98 through 2-116 of CoMe oF VuirxIA
dealing with motion picture censorship. VIFcaINA Acrs 1966, ch. 516 extends the obscenity
statute § 18.1-236 VmGixrP CODE, to motion pictures.
17. KANSAS ADmiN. REGs., § 18-1-1 et seq. (Weeks, ed., 1965).
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interest because of the subject matter; and the "blue movie," or
smoker film, made for private viewings in homes or lodge halls. One
of the problems that beset the early film industry was the failure to
sort out and segregate these markets, with the result that products kept
reaching the wrong audiences. This result is unlikely to occur in the
present state of the film industry, but critics disturbed by obscenity
have a tendency to obfuscate the differences between these varieties
of movies made for such very different audiences-and so do the pro-
ducers of the general circulation movie. In an age that has adopted the
conformity of non-conformity, they have been obliged to make bold
promises of unrestraint to persuade the incipient ticket purchaser that
the downtown Bijou has something almost as racy as those smoker
movies. He may never be among a group of bankers for whom the girl
will jump out of the cake, nor may he ever be in the warm, beery at-
mosphere of a private "blue"-film collector's home; but he thinks the
Bijou is offering something just about as juicy-because that's what
the advertisements say.18
It is doubtful if the Bijou can ever succeed in meeting the implica-
tions of that promise, no matter how liberal mores become or how in-
different the law may be to sex exhibitions. The sources of sexual
stimulation vary among different people, and many of the "blue"
movies are aimed at a very special audience. A perennial favorite on
the smoker circuit depicts a priest interrupting mass to copulate with
a female corpse in a coffin and later sodomizing the acolytes on the
altar. It is highly doubtful that such a picture will ever appear at the
BiJou, although in more disguised forms the Bijou may be hinting at
just such conduct in its horror and "teen" films, especially with the
now current themes of necrophilia and pedophilia. More refined dis.
plays on film, such as the one of the naked woman having intercourse
with an eel, will remain out of general circulation even if the moral
tastes of Americans should sink below the level of Petronius' Rome:
what is sexually stimulating to one man is nauseating to another, and
some stimulants are too peculiar.19 But the very fact that such weird
demands exist strengthens the power of the suggestive advertisement,
just as long as it avoids specificity: it lets the Bijou lure with the
18. Harold Hobson, a critic for the London Sunday Times, has raised some of these
issues in reviewing Colin Spencer's play, The Ballad of the False Barman, 1.3 A rtAs 55.56
(April, 1967).
19. Over six decades ago, G. Stanley Hall had noted this. "[Tjjhe pervasiveness and
wide and fantastic irradiations of sex symbolism have some support . . . in the prurient
fancy . . . whose sensitiveness is so hypertrophied that [it] sees indecent allusions In al-
most every form, act, and word." G. HALL, ADOL.scEuNc 470 (1904).
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seduction of unknown evil because, in that sense, Theda Bara is not
dead.
But such attractions at the BiJou will be the cynosure of more than
potential ticket-buyers. Those in the community who believe obscene
films cause criminal and asocial conduct are also interested. Whether
or not films do produce such conduct is a vexed question upon which
Dr. Carmen refuses to take a stand. Yet it runs through all arguments
on the obscenity issue. Can a book, a magazine, a recording, or a movie
cause criminal conduct by one exposed to such influence? If there
were a wider suppression of morally questionable material, would
there be a decline in crime and psychopathology?
The police certainly believe the answer to both questions is yes.
Any policeman will say that "every" sex offender he arrests has porno-
graphic materials in his possession. The censors whom Dr. Carmen in-
terviewed -were also equally sure that their work was saving society
from the assaults of obscenity upon the immature of all ages. Indeed,
they were nearly all careful to observe that the most objectionable
aspect of American movies was not a direct expression of lust but
rather a morbid preoccupation with violence.20 This emphasis gibes
with the claims of those who for many years have said that the high
incidence of aggressive crime in America has been due to the constant
exposure of its youth to gory, cruel, sado-masochistic comics, cartoons,
movies, and television serials. Not even Walt Disney has been spared,
with the result that certain scenes involving the step-mother queen in
Snow White have been suppressed since its original showing three
decades ago. The same thing has happened to Wizard of Oz, where the
more dramatic scenes of the Wicked Witch have been removed. But
while American children have been protected from Snow W7hite and
the Wizard of Oz, not much has been done to insulate them from other
fictive horror-shows, of which the James Bond movies would be only
among the worst examples. A child who observed Commander Bond in
the fading clinch of one of these garish epics might be excused for
thinking pain and death are synonyms for sex.
2'
20. Censors in New York State and Memphis thought the problem in American films
was violence, CARmEN 271, 311, but Maryland and Virginia censors were not too concerned
about violence as compared to sex, id. 279, 289, and the Chicago censors were concerned
only if the movie caused violence, id. 299.
21. See the discussion by Orlow and Francis, AMss CoMtsuxceATO.N A;D CMaME, SOci-
OLOGY OF CRnE (Roucek ed. 1961) beginning at p. 239. Of course, since 1939 children's
librarians have largely succeeded in removing from their shelves as unsuitable reading
material the books of the Grimm Brothers and L. Frank Baum, upon which the above
fairy-tale films were based.
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Dr. Carmen, who describes the unpleasantness of sitting through a
movie banned by the Virginia censors, would approve the suppression
of films-or any other communications media-that led either chil-
dren or adults to commit acts harmful to themselves or others. Indeed,
despite his antagonism to pre-screening of films he is troubled by
Justice Musmanno's conviction that "[d]amage is done at the very
first exhibition of the film," and by the Justice's question, "[h]ow will
the [subsequent] punishment of the exhibitor heal the lacerating
wounds made in the delicate sensations of children and sensitive adults
who witness a picture of lewdness, depravity and immorality?"2 2 Any.
one who has observed an autopsy of a victim of a sexual assault must
be similarly troubled. Even to read an autopsy report in which the
victim had a blazing lump of coal thrust into her vagina must disturb
the contemplative, to cite but one illustration. Why was such a crime
perpetrated in this particular manner? What moved the psyche of the
attacker to find his pleasure in this particular way? Did any obscene
pictures in his possession charge him up to the commission of this kind
of a battery? Assuredly, if such a correlation could be established, the
sacrifice of obscene publications in exchange for the cessation of such
activity would be a small price to pay.
But the correlation seems lacking. Sex offenses occurred in Puritan
New England in sufficient numbers that the governor of Massachusetts
Bay consulted the elders as to what steps to take to cope with them.23
Clearly, there were few external inducements in the way of pictures,
books, or theatrical performances that could have produced these
crimes. The "Mountain-Man" of Burnt Cabins, Pennsylvania, had no
obscene literature around him at the time of his capture. The police
did find in his house a brick chamber almost exactly like that in the
film and novel, The Collector; but there was no evidence he was fa-
miliar with either. The only book they found was a well-thumbed
popular work on the marriage customs of primitive peoples, in which
particular attention seemed to have been given to the mock-rape
variety of mating. This man had the delusive desire to kidnap a
woman and drag her away into a cave in the mountains, where he and
22. CARQmN 242-43. In a recent appellate argument before the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court concerning the novel Candy, Mr. Justice Musmanno put counsel Albert Gerber,
Esq., author of SEx, PORNOGRAPHY, AND JusrcE (1965) through a rigorous grilling, express-
ing the same viewpoint as the one quoted by Dr. Carmen. See the reports in the Phila.
delphia Inquirer and the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, on April 26, 1967.
23. The phenomenon was, in fact, called a "crime wave" by Richard B. Morris; It
"swept over" both Massachusetts Bay and Plymouth Plantation in 1642-43. R. Moiuus,
STUDIES IN THE HIsToRY OF Ai.RICAN LAw 38 (2d ed. 1958).
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she would live--"happily ever after," one assumes. He had made re-
peated efforts to consummate such a kidnapping before his seizure of
Miss Bradnick, but no one could say whether this single book trig-
gered his delusion or whether the delusion had been formed before he
read the book.2 4 And, of course, while most sex offenders do have sex-
oriented material in their possession, the quantity of such stuff sold in
the United States would indicate that most of its readers are not led
by it into lives of overt crime. Admittedly, however, no one can know
what goes on in private rooms, so perhaps this argument is not as per-
suasive as it appears-or perhaps it is just further proof of the proposi-
tion that all men are guilty of some offense.
In fact, this is the belief of many who would suppress obscene ma-
terial. They start with the assumption that all men are evil, that they
learn with effort to suppress their natural selves, and that it is the
function of church, state, and society to help the individual in this
never-ending, never-finally-successful struggle.25 It is also the view of
certain modem existentialist ethicalists, who conclude, however, that
since all men are so hopeless no man can judge another-so let the
obscenity of the human race be.20 Dr. Carmen eschews all of these
theological and philosophical debates, but they are nonetheless central
to the importance of suppressing some mode of expression on the
ground that it is obscene, hence harmful, hence punishable. Without
either behavioral evidence or some philosophical premise about the
nature of man, it is impossible to know whether one is dealing with
something of supreme importance or a mere triviality.
Yet even dismissing obscenity as trivial does not completely dispose
of the subject of censorship. Dr. Carmen seems to believe that since
Near v. Minnesota27 obscenity has increasingly become the sole reason
for censoring particular modes of expression. But is it? Certainly
Regina v. Hicklin, the leading case upholding censorship, rested on
more than a desire to protect the immature.28 That, to be sure, is the
rationale the case is commonly cited for, and modem courts have de-
parted from Hicklin because they found that rationale unpersuasive.
24. The information on this case is drawn from a presentation at the Fifth FBI Sex
Crimes Criteria Seminar near Swiftwater, Pennsylvania, Mar. 16-17, 1967.
25. This viewpoint was explained by the Rev. W. Carter Merbrier, pastor, Messiah
Lutheran Church, Philadelphia, in a panel broadcast on the Frank Ford Show on Station
WCAU, Philadelphia, Apr. 15, 1967. On the work of Rev. Aferbrier to suppress obscen-
ity, see the article by MlcCormick, The Smut Establishment, in The Philadelphia Afaga-
zine, March, 1967.
26. E.g., A. Goaz, TmE TRArrOR (Howard transl. 1959).
27. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
28. Regina v. Hicklin [1868] L.R. 3 Q.B. 360.
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But in fact the prosecution was initiated primarily because the tracts
concerned were Protestant propaganda which attributed vile conduct
to members of Roman Catholic religious orders, intended for distribu-
tion among Irish Catholics living in England. Though the English
prosecutor may have had no doubt that Irish immigrants were im-
mature, his greater concern was their propensity to riot. Literature
such as this was designed to produce civil tumult-a result which
would probably have pleased its publishers even more than instant
Irish conversion to the Queen's religion.
29
Dr. Carmen doubts that this ground would support either prior or
subsequent censorship of a film.
In any event it is difficult to conceive of the Supreme Court's
placing its stamp of approval on the commonly used practice of
deleting from movies "certain words" like "nigger" that might
offend the Negro. Nor is it possible that scenes in moving pictures
that depict hangings or the burning of human beings can be cut
out arbitrarily, consistent with free speech guarantees.3 0
In the case of The Birth of a Nation, the N.A.A.C.P. has concentrated
upon social pressure to prevent its showing, pursuing it even to church
exhibitions in remote rural villages.81 On the other hand, the K.K.K.
has been pushing hard for its revival, arguing that it is a major artistic
event in the history of the cinema that cannot be suppressed merely be-
cause it might incite some violent action by its viewers.82 Because of
its large Negro population and because of its long history of Negro.
white rioting, Chicago's police censors will rarely allow the use of the
word "nigger" in a film.33
All of this raises the issue of whether the public authority can sup-
press in whole or in part, previously or subsequently to a public ap-
pearance, any mode of communication-other than a cry of fire in a
crowded theater-on the grounds that it might have or has had the
consequences of causing a public disturbance. The Miracle could not
be banned on the ground of sacrilege, according to the United States
Supreme Court. And yet, despite that decision, it was effectively
29. See the discussion by Whitmore, Obscenity in Literature: Crime or Free Speech,
4 SYDNEY L. REV. 179, 181-82 (1963).
30. CARMEN 231.
31. The efforts of the NAACP included the prevention of a showing of a privately
owned copy of the film in the Universalist Church of Smithton, Pa., in 1964.
32. CARMEN 316 (quoting Christine S. Gilliam).
33. Id. 299 (quoting Sergeant Robert E. Murphy as saying that the previewing board
of the Film Review Section of the Chicago Police Department reached this conclusion
despite lack of objection from a Negro member).
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banned by smoke bombs in the theater, raucous pickets in front of
the box-office, and constant investigations by hostile officials to dis-
cover if the theater were in violation of fire, health, or building codes.
When any mode of expression leads to riot or disorder in the streets,
some means can usually be found for suppressing it, whatever liberal
pronouncements the court may have made.34 But must these measures
be extra-legal, sub-constitutional devices, or can the law under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments consciously take account of the
likelihood that certain words or scenes will lead to violence? If so, must
the law wait until the violence actually occurs? And if the law must
wait, is it confined to punishing the violent or may it enjoin that which
has induced them to violence? A little knowledge of what Jacob Burck-
hardt called "the terrible twentieth century" makes these questions
pertinent.
Assuming that such relics as The Birth of A Nation or Jew Siiss do
lead to disorder or do poison the body politic, does this simply become
the price that must be paid for maintaining a free market place of
ideas?35 Or can the problem be resolved by breaking up the viewing
public into segmented audiences, with different treatments for the
differing segments? For example, it has often been suggested that
films be rated as fit for audiences of any age, for adults or for children
only, or for children when accompanied by adults. The last rating
category implies that parents rather than the state should be the final
arbiters as to what is harmful to their offspring; but whatever their
theoretical merits, such ratings have not been very effective in exclud-
ing children from any films, since the thorough policing of cinemas
is in practice too burdensome a job.30 Another frequent suggestion has
been special distribution. This method is in fact commonly employed,
to exempt films "to be exhibited for purely educational, charitable,
fraternal, or religious reasons."37 Presumably these special limited audi-
ences have been regarded as outside the harmful reach of the contents
of such films. Some local authorities have extended the idea by permit-
34. The kind of extreme attitudes one can expect where the issue of sacrilege is raised
can be ilustrated by religious groups that approve the death penalty for blaspheming the
name of Jesus. SLAVEs OF THE I.MMNIACULATE HEART OF MARY, SAI'TS TO K %OW AND LOv
164 (1954).
35. See T. RoBINsON, MFN, GRoups, AND THE COMMUNITY 186, 138 (1940) for a brief
discussion of the question in the context of a democratic society dealing with political
groups urging violence to terminate Democracy.
36. See CArMEN 247-49.
37. This type of language seems to have been present in all state censorship acts. See
CARmEN 143, 154, 167, 177.
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ting the local "art-house" to show a wider spectrum of films than others
and then keeping close police watch upon the privileged house.38
Giorgio Nelson Page, a leading Italian opponent of obscenity in
entertainment, has suggested that where art forms are subsidized by
government, the subsidizing authority should grant or withhold funds
on the basis of conformity to prescribed moral rules. By extension, his
approach would also countenance a system of tax rebates for the
makers of moral films, or a refusal of business deductions to makers
of films found to be obscene, or a system of license fees graduated ac-
cording to the amount of obscenity in the film. Indeed, if the present
National Foundation of the Arts and Humanities in the United States
were to subsidize films, they would probably prescribe standards as to
the type of films desired. But the American constitutional system poses
in these areas large barriers to Page's sort of suggestions. Indeed, Dr.
Carmen even wonders if an official system of limiting certain film
viewings to a few selected sites would not constitute a deprivation of
the property rights of those businessmen whose enterprises were not
favored by selection or of the producers of the films so limited in circu-
lation who would thereby be deprived of the chance of the larger
income from a wider audience.80
The best argument for free expression of ideas has always been, of
course, that the cost is ultimately redeemed by the results. Both ma-
terially and spiritually, the liberal, anti-censoring view is one of opti-
mism as to final positive results from permitting even lewd or violence-
inducing expressions. The Supreme Court's protection of all allegedly
obscene expression which has any redeeming social, scientific, or aes-
thetic value is a product of this analysis. Probably the Court would
even approve the use of obscenity for therapeutic purposes, if a rea-
sonable case for its efficacy could be made in some particular instance.40
It is not too unreasonable a caricature to describe the Court's view
as holding that obscenity does no harm until and unless a final deter-
mination of worthlessness has been passed upon the entire work in
which the offensive stuff appears. Several years ago the Hungarian
satirist Somogyi had a good deal of fun with this kind of approach
when he asked the question, "Can a nude mirror a social truth, as we
38. Id. 203 (citing a Detroit practice), 308-09 (citing a Memphis practice which had
been discontinued because it "was resented by other exhibitors).
39. Id. 204. Though his comments are cast in terms of what he calls "illegal" practices,
it seems plain he would regard such practices as unconstitutional if a statute made clear
such a policy of segregation.
40. The High Bailiff of the Isle of Man has so ruled. See Manchester Guardian. Sept.
19, 1953, at 2.
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rightly demand from all works of art?" After insisting that "this ques-
tion is as simple as the nose on your face" he set up several examples
of what are or are not "redeemed lewd uses." An unredeemed example
would be a nude woman sitting in a cafe, because "no decent girl
would appear naked in a busy place of entertainment." A redeemed
example would be a woman taking a shower because it emphasizes, "in
addition to the feminine lines," both hygiene and the housing pro-
gram. Indeed, a nude woman's picture may be doubly redeemed, as
by his example of "Nymph in a Forest," which "undoubtedly implies
that we have already liquidated the hooligans who used to scare the
daylights out of the nature lovers." Clearly, as Somogyi indicates, this
process of determining ultimate redeemability can be a very tricky
business.1
In a sense, the whole program of censorship versus total liberty is
covered by what Dr. Carmen calls his "summing up." Censorship has
to be used, at this point, in a broader sense than Dr. Carmen has used
it; but as the experience of Grove Press has proven in the numerous
litigations in which it has become involved throughout the United
States, a post-screening prosecution or injunction can be nearly as
oppressive as a pre-screening requirement and can constitute a kind
of censorship. But putting definitions aside, this is how Dr. Carmen
sees the problem in its fundamental terms:
The First Amendment guarantees free speech to each member
of the American political community. But this privilege can be
the bane of an adult citizenry if it is misused, abused, or cor-
rupted. In short, free speech is impossible without ground rules.42
And what would Dr. Carmen do in the case of those persons who re-
fuse to observe the ground rules? He deals with them in separate cate-
gories but, despite the libertarian sentiments so often expressed in
other parts of the book, his conclusion is quite emphatic.
[S]ociety's right to be free from the revulsions of obscenity ...
means that adults may be kept from seeing films whose dominant
appeal relates to the prurient instincts of the average person. For
the child, this should mean immunization from everything that is
obscene regardless of other competing values that a movie might
enhance .... [B]ecause a free society buttressed by a First Amend-
ment presupposes an enlightened, mature, average man who more
41. See Somogyi, Can a Naked Woman Contribute to the Cultural Front, Lu.,s MAT1.'i,
Mar. 22, 1962 (reprinted in 3 ATL&s 480 (1962)).
42. CARMEN 259.
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times than not can work out his destiny better than others can
do it for him .... methods of control for both these elements of
society must be balanced and regulated by guarantees of due
process such as are afforded in the courts.
43
Thus, despite Dr. Carmen's opposition to what he calls censorship,
he does not favor license in expression, or a liberty even approaching
license. Such language assumes a consensus as to what is obscene. It
likewise imputes to obscenity an inherent horror that must make the
hackles rise on Hugh Hefner's Playboy head. He would recognize in
this language the voice of a defender of the values traditional to West-
ern Civilization ever since St. Augustine came back to the bosom of
St. Monica and Mother Church.44 Aesthetically society may not want
more obscene expressions than are already available" and morally
society may want a greater concentration on abstract values than is
currently common. But scientifically there is at present no certainty
that exposure to obscenity leads directly to criminal or anti-social con-
duct. Perhaps it does; perhaps it does not; perhaps it even has a posi-
tive value for releasing inhibited feelings through a deflected and
vicarious outlet. As yet, none of these are the proven result and it may
be a little premature to be as righteous as Dr. Carmen's conclusion.
Constitutionally, however, Dr. Carmen has accurately described the
probable future course of the United States Supreme Court in these
cases. There is a general public concern over what is regarded as a
"rising tide" of obscenity and pressure is growing for a federal statute
wider in scope and more modern in application than the present
legislation. Indeed, the Ginzburg decision may have been a disguised
appeal to Congress from the Court itself to draft laws along the line
of suppressing procurers.40 It shifts attention from the prostitute to
the pimp and makes his motive all-important. Perhaps the Court feels
Congress will relieve it of the job of serving as Head Smut Board for
the United States. In any event, this issue is not settled as yet 41 and
43. CmAniN 259-60.
44. For a brief version of St. Augustine's entelechy see Dino Bigongiari, The Political
Ideas of St. Augustine, in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF ST. AUGUSTINE App. (Paoluccl ed.
1962).
45. For example, the commentator Ralph Collier called for an investigation by the
Federal Communications Commission to clean up "the garbage that has been tipped over"
into current popular music and praised radio broadcasters who ban such songs from the
air waves in a radio broadcast on Station WFLN in Philadelphia, May 1, 1967.
46. It appears to me this is what underlies Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413
(1966) and Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966), though Mishkin v. United States,
383 U.S. 502 (1966), may indicate a misunderstanding on my part of what Mr. Justice
Brennan was driving at in the first two cases.
47. Fred M. Vinson, Jr., Chief, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice,
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in the future litigation Dr. Carmen's book is likely to be cited. As a
libertarian, one would hope it will be his freer rather than his more
rigid views that will prevail.
EARL FNBAu MURPH t
has issued a restated definition of obscenity for departmental guidance, Memorandum ol
April 13, 1967. This possibility is reinforced in the Court's recent pronouncemepts in
Redrup v. New York, 87 S. Ct. 1414 (1967); Holding v. Blankenship, 87 S. Ct. 1418 (1957);
and Blankenship v. Holding, 87 S. Ct. 1419 (1967).
t Professor, Temple University School of Law and Institute of Law and the Health
Sciences. A.B. 1949, M.A. 1954, Butler University; J.D. 1952, Indiana University; LL.M.
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